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The choice of exchange rate regime has become one of the most important issues one 
more time in many economies after the financial crises in recent years. In the wake of 
the financial crises, many countries, especially emerging market economies, opted for 
floating exchange rate regimes by forsaking the pegged regimes. Consequently, an old 
debate on the choice and determinants of exchange rate regimes has been triggered. 
Economists  have  started  to  debate  what  appropriate  exchange  rate  regime  for  an 
economy is.  When the tendency in recent years is taken into consideration, the choice 
of  exchange  rate  regime  of  countries,  especially  emerging  economies,  needs  to  be 
analyzed.  To  do  this,  in  this  paper,  we  attempt  to  uncover  how  emerging  market 
economies  choose  their  exchange  rate  regimes.  In  other  words,  we  try  to  find  the 
economic and political  factors underlying the  choice of  exchange rate  regimes. The 
study  includes  25  emerging  market  economies  over  the  period  1970-2006.  We  use 
random effect ordered probit model in order to find the long run economic and political 
determinants of exchange rate regimes for emerging economies. The determinants of 
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Introduction 
Following  the  financial  crises  in  recent  decade,  many  countries  switched  from  one 
exchange rate regime to another (mostly rigid one to more flexible one). It has fueled 
the old debate on the choices and determinants of exchange rate regimes. Economists 
have started to argue what appropriate exchange regime for an economy is once more. 
Over the past 40 years, economists have developed various answers to this question. 
The first contribution to the debate came from optimum currency area (OCA) theory. It 
explains that how some macroeconomic aggregates of a country affect flexibility of an 
exchange rate regime to be adopted by that country. In the meanwhile, regime choices 
have  also  been  discussed  in  terms  of  optimal  stabilization  policy,  monetary  policy 
credibility and currency crises. Since the second half of 1990s, the empirical literature 
(Edwards, 1996; Breger et al., 2000) has tended to explain the role of political and 
institutional variables in regime choices. The empirical studies using political variables 
generally  say  that  there  is  a  negative  correlation  between  political  instability  and 
exchange rate flexibility. The last contribution to the debate was made by Calvo and 
Reinhart with fear of floating in 2000. It has brought about to realize that there is a 
serious difference between de jure and de facto exchange rate regimes. The economists 
say  that  owing  to  fear  of  floating,  some  macroeconomic  variables  affect  choices  of 
regimes in an opposite  direction to what the previous theories say.  Besides, fear of 
floating creates a difference between what countries say and what countries do. Because 
of  the  difference  between  the  de  jure  and  de  facto  exchange  regimes,  the  de  facto 
regimes are also taken into account in this paper.  
In order to explain the determinants of exchange rate regimes, empirical researchers 
have applied theoretical guidelines to the observed choices of exchange rate regimes. In 
doing  this,  most  studies  have  employed  the  de  jure  regimes  that  the  governments 
announce, while few studies have used the de facto regimes that they actually pursue. 
Until recently, the distinction between de jure and de facto regimes has mostly been 
ignored  in  the  literature.  The  studies  by  Gosh  et  al.  (1997),  and  Levy-Yeyati  and 
Sturzenegger  (1999,  2005),  and  Clavo  and  Reinhart  (2000)  developed  some 
classification  methods  to  determine  type  of  exchange  rate  regime  of  a  country  in  a 
specific year or period. They have reached that there was a serious difference between 
the de jure and de facto exchange rate regimes. Although why countries put into effect 
exchange rate regimes different from their official announcements remains a puzzle in 
the literature, it appears that the de facto classifications are more reliable than the de 
jure classifications.  
Although there are many studies on the determinants of exchange rate regimes, there are 
no studies analyzing especially emerging market economies at least as far as we know. 
With this motivation, we analyze emerging market economies in this paper. Since most 
of  the  papers  haven’t  used  panel  estimation  method  and  /  or  disregarded  the  panel 
characteristics  of  data,  their  results  may  be  misleading.  In  order  to  overcome  this 
problem,  we  use  random  effect  panel  probit  model  in  analyzing  emerging  market 
economies. The rest of paper is organized as fallows. Section 2 presents the literature 
review. In section 3 and 4, the data and estimation method are explained respectively. 
The empirical results are presented in the next section. The paper results in conclusion 
in section 6.  
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Literature Review 
The empirical findings on the determinants of exchange rate regimes are numerous and 
controversial. The reason for the differences among the findings mostly depends on the 
country samples taken into consideration, time periods, regime classifications used in 
the analyses, estimation methods and assumptions of econometric models.  
As stated before, the econometric methods and regime classifications used in the papers 
are different from each other. Thus, it creates different results. For instance, some of the 
studies (Edwards, 1998; Berger et. al; 2000; and Meon and Rizzo, 2002) used a simple 
binary structure to classify exchange rate regimes into either fixed or flexible ones while 
the  others  (Poirson,  2001;  Zhou,  2003;  and  Von  Hagen  and  Zhou,  2007)  used  an 
ordered-choice or multinomial-choice structure in order to classify the regimes. Besides, 
the studies also differs form each other in terms of estimation methods.  A commonly 
used estimation method in the papers (Heller, 1978; Holden et el., 1979; Melvin, 1985; 
Edwards, 1998; Rizzo, 1998; Poirson, 2001; and Juhn and Mauro, 2002) is cross section 
analysis. Due to technical difficulties in the estimation of panel data models, especially 
due to the heavy computational burden of numerical integrations, panel data models are 
rarely implemented in the literature. Few of the studies in the literature (Zhou, 2003; 
Kato and Uctum, 2005, Von Hagen and Zhou 2007) employed panel data models in 
order to empirically analyze the determinants of exchange rate regimes. 
The studies on the determinants of exchange rate regimes largely consist of the papers 
including the developing countries ( Rizzo, 1998;  Breger et. al, 2000; Poirson, 2001; 
Zhou 2003;  Von Hagen and Zhou, 2005, Bleaney and Francisco, 2005); or both the 
developing and developed countries  (Meon and Rizzo, 2002; Juhn and Mauro 2002; 
Kato and Uctum, 2005,  Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger,  2007).  A few of the paper 
(Collins,  1996;  Papaioannou,  2003;  Markiewic,  2006)  considered  specific  country 
groups  such  as  Latin  American  countries,  Central  American  countries,  transition 
economies and etc. In the existing literature, as far as we know, there are no studies 
focused  on  emerging  market  economies.  This  motivates  us  to  analyze  emerging 
economies.  
Most studies considered some of the optimum currency area variables, such as trade 
openness,  size  of  economy,  degree  of  economic  development  and  geographical 
concentration of trade.  In addition, some studies also included such macroeconomic 
variables as inflation, foreign exchange reserves, domestic credit, real exchange rate, 
and terms of trade. Also, a few studies contained political or institutional variables.  
When the results of previous studies are considered, no results appear to be reasonably 
robust to changes in country coverage, sample period, estimation method, and exchange 
rate regime classification. For instance, trade openness is positively associated with the 
probability of adopting a flexible regime in the papers by Dreyer, 1978; Bernard and 
Leblang, 1999; Poirson, 2001; Juhn and Mauro, 2002; Von Hagen and Zhou, 2005), 
whereas it is negatively associated with the probability of adopting a flexible regime in 
the papers by Melvin, 1985; Rizzo, 1998; Berger et. al., 2000; and Meon, and Rizzo, 
2002). Likewise, size of economy (Gross Domestic Product) is found to be positively 
associated  with  floating  regimes  in  almost  all  studies,  but  not  always  significantly.  
Economic development (GDP per capita) is found to be significantly associated with 
floating regimes by four studies (Holden et. al.,1979; Savvides, 1990; Edwards, 1996, International Conference on Emerging Economic Issues in a Globalizing World, Đzmir, 2008 
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and Von Hagen and Zhou, 2005) significantly associated with fixed regimes by three 
studies  (  Honkapojha  and  Pikkarainen,  1994;  Edwards,  1999;  Rizzo,  1998)  and  not 
significantly  associated  with  any  particular  regime  by  another  two  studies  (Collins, 
1996, and  Poirson, 2001). Inflation is always positively and significantly associated 
with floating except for one study (Von Hagen and Zhou, 2005).  The similar results are 
valid  for  the  other  variables  (the  other  macroeconomic,  political  and  institutional 
variables). This suggests that the macroeconomic, political and institutional variables 
are not robust predictors of exchange rate regime choice. On the other hand, it doesn’t 
mean  this  denies  the  potential  importance  certain  variables  for  specific  groups  of 
countries, in certain time periods, or across some of the regime categories.  
Data Description 
All  series  are  annual  and  cover  the  years  1970  to  2006.  Our  analysis  takes  into 
consideration 25 emerging market economies
1. The World Development indicators and 
International Financial Statistic are main sources for most of the independent variables. 
All  the  political  variables  come  from  Database  of  Political  Institution-2006.  The 
variable representing capital account restriction (CAR) is taken the paper by Prasad, et. 
al.  (2003).  Based  on  theoretical  suggestions  and  empirical  findings,  we  take  into 
consideration  three  groups  of  potential  exchange  rate  regime  determinants:  OCA 
fundamentals, macroeconomic aggregates, and political and institutional features. The 
exact  construction  of  data  and  data  sources  are  reported  in  the  Appendix  I.  The 
descriptive  statistics  of  data  and  correlation  matrix  of  explanatory  variables  are 
presented  in  the  Appendix  II  and  III  respectively.  The  explanatory  variables,  their 
symbols and definitions are as follows: 
For OCA fundamentals, we include trade openness (OPENNESS, measured as imports 
plus  exports  as  a  share  of  GDP),  geographical  trade  concentration  (GEOGTRADE, 
measured by the share of the largest trade partner in total trade), inflation differential 
(INFLATION, measured as USA inflation minus domestic inflation), size of economy 
(GPD,  measured  by  gross  domestic  product  in  logarithm),  and  level  of  economic 
development (GDPpercapita, measured by log of GDP per capita). The OCA theory 
says  that  more  open  economies  want  to  adopt  less  flexible  regimes  while  larger 
economies and economies with higher level of GDP per capita want to adopt more 
flexible regimes. 
For  macroeconomic  aggregates,  we  employ  current  account  deficit  or  surplus  (CA, 
measured as current account deficit/surplus as a share of GDP), de facto capital account 
openness  (CAOPENNESS;  measured  as  sum  of  the  absolute  value  of  inward  and 
outward gross capital as a ratio of GDP) , reserves (RESERVES, measured as total 
reserves as a ratio of  Imports) , rate of growth of M2 (M2GROWTH, measured as 
annual growth rate of money plus quasi money), and terms of trade (TOT, measured as 
standard deviation of annual percentage change of terms of trade). The economic theory 
suggests that high reserves are associated with a fixed regime. 
                                                 
1 While determining emerging market economies, we use Morgan Stanley Emerging Index. This index 
includes 26 emerging economies. Owing to lack of data on Thailand, we exclude this country.  The 
countries considered in this paper are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Czech Republic, Egypt, 
Hungary,  India,  Indonesia,  Israel,  Jordan,  Korea,  Malaysia,  Mexico,  Morocco,  Pakistan,  Peru, 
Philippines, Poland, Russia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Turkey.   International Conference on Emerging Economic Issues in a Globalizing World, Đzmir, 2008 
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In  an  attempt  to  reflect  the  political  and  institutional  features,  we  consider  capital 
account restriction (CAR), period of duration of chief executive in office (YRSOFFC), 
a  variable  showing  that  executive  parties  have  an  absolute  majority  in  assembly 
(MAJORITY),  and  a  variable  representing  whether  executive  party  is  nationalist 
(NATINALIST)  or  not.  All  the  OCA  and  macroeconomic  variables  are  lagged  one 
period to avoid potential endogeneity problems. Most of the previous studies imply that 
there is a negative relationship between political stability and flexibility of an exchange 
rate regime. 
As  a  dependent  variable,  the  de  facto  classification  called  natural  classification  by 
Reinhart  and  Rogoff  (2003)  and  the  de  jure  classification  based  on  the  IMF’s 
classification are used. Natural classification is coded as follows
2: 1 for pegged regimes, 
2 for limited flexibility arrangements, 3 for managed floating, 4 for freely floating, and 
5 freely falling. Freely falling is a new category introduced by the authors that indicates 
high inflation period in which annual inflation rate is higher than 40 %. We also use the 
more detailed version of natural classification including the fifteen different regimes. 
Since  natural  classification  classifies  the  regimes  until  the  year  2001,  the  de  facto 
classification  is  used  in  the  estimated  for  the  period  1970-2001.  As  a  dependent 
variable, the new IMF exchange rate classification (the de jure classification) that has 
been in use since 1999 is employed in the analysis for the years 1999-2006, too. The de 
jure exchange rate regimes of countries are taken from the various IMF Annual Reports. 
In this classification the least flexible regime takes the lowest value while the most 
flexible regime takes the highest value: 1 for no separate legal tender, 2 for currency 
board, 3 other conventional fixed peg, 4 for pegged exchange rates within horizontal 
bands, 5 crawling bands, 6 for exchange rates within crawling bands, 7 for managed 
floating,  and  8  for  independently  floating.  In  addition,  we  combine  the  IMF 
classifications before and after 1999 and construct a new dependent variable over the 
period 1996 to 2006
3.  
Estimation Strategy 
In  this  section,  we  present  the  econometric  model  which  is  applied  to  test  the 
determinants of exchange rate regimes in  emerging  economies  for the period 1970-
2006. We use a random effect ordered probit model for an unbalanced panel of 25 
emerging market economies. We describe the choices of exchange rate regimes in our 
sample using a discrete variable yit, which takes a value of yit = 1 if the least flexible 
regime selected by country i in year t, and yit = J for the most flexible regime. This 
choice based on the latent variable y
*
it, which is a function of the variables discussed 
above. A larger value of the latent variable indicates that a more flexible regime is 
desirable for the country and period under consideration. Given the discrete nature of 
regime choices, we assume that a country chooses the least flexible regime, yit = 1, if 
                                                 
2  Reinhart  and  Rogoff  (2003)  classify  exchange  rate  regimes  into  15  and  6  subcategories.  The  last 
categories both in 15-way and 6-way classifications don’t represent a exchange rate regime, and denote 
missing data category. So we exclude these categories from the classifications and regard them as 14-way 
and 5-way classifications in this paper. 
3 The old IMF exchange rate classification before 1999 divides  the exchange rate regimes into four 
categories: (1) pegged to single currency or currency basket, (2) limited flexibility, (3) managed floating, 
and (4) independent float. When we combine the old and new IMF classifications, categories 1 and 2 in 
the old classification are regarded as other conventional fixed pegs and exchange rates within crawling 
bands in the new classification respectively. Similarly, category 3 and 4 are received as managed floating, 
and independently floating in the new classification respectively. International Conference on Emerging Economic Issues in a Globalizing World, Đzmir, 2008 
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latent variable is below a certain threshold, y
*
it ≤ m0. Similarly, the most flexible regime 
is chosen, yit = J, if the latent variable is above another threshold, mj-1 < y
*
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where the ms is unknown cut point parameters (thresholds).  
The estimated equation for the model is equation below.  
* '
it it it y X b e = +    for  i = 1, 2, 3, …….N, and t = 0, 1, …..Ti   
where  Xit,  β,  t  and  i  represent  are  a  vector  of  explanatory  variables,  a  vector  of 
coefficients, country and time respectively
4. The estimates of the coefficients of the 
vector Xit and of the thresholds, i.e, m1 < m2 < m3….<mj-1 are obtained by maximizing 
the likelihood function by using the quadratic hill climbing algorithm.  
Empirical Results 
In  this  section,  we  present  the  results  of  random  effect  ordered  probit  analyses, 
conducted by using the unbalanced panel data sets. We estimate several specifications 
both for the de jure and de facto classifications. The results of estimations are presented 
in Table 1. We estimate the four regressions varying across regime classifications and 
time periods. The results of the first and the second regression are obtained for the 
period  1970-2001  by  using  the  5-way  classification  (RR  5),  and  the  14-way 
classification  (RR  14)  developed  by  Reinhart  and  Rogoff  (2003)  as  a  dependent 
variable.  The  third  and  fourth  regressions  are  estimated  by  using  the  new  IMF 







                                                 
4 Note that the panel is unbalanced as Ti varies across i. International Conference on Emerging Economic Issues in a Globalizing World, Đzmir, 2008 
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Table 1: Random Effect Ordered Regression Results For Emerging Economies 
   1970–2001     1970–2001     1999–2006     1996–2006   
Variable              RR 5              RR 14             IMF1
a               IMF2
b    
GDP  0.0555    0.2176 ***  0.1810    0.6285 *** 
   (0.0838)    (0.0797)    (0.3624)    (0.2021)   
GDPpercapita  0.9409 ***  0.5272 ***  0.9347 ***  -0.7449 *** 
   (0.1154)    (0.1066)    (0.3514)    (0.2040)   
OPENNESS  0.0094 ***  0.0011    0.0054    0.0002   
   (0.0032)    (0.0027)    (0.0076)    (0.0045)   
INFLATION  -0.0014 ***  -0.0013 ***  0.0338    0.0171   
   (0.0005)    (0.0005)    (0.0223)    (0.0142)   
GEOGTRADE  -0.0104 *  -0.0082    0.0898 ***  0.0612 *** 
   (0.0059)    (0.0055)    (0.0272)    (0.0177)   
CAGDP  0.0128    0.0061    0.0503    -0.0174   
   (0.0163)    (0.0152)    (0.0537)   (0.0299)   
CAOPENNESS  0.0016    0.0017    0.1045 *  0.1044 *** 
   (0.0129)    (0.0119)    (0.0554)    (0.0299)   
RESERVES  -0.2864 ***  -0.1922 ***  -0.0474    -0.0376   
   (0.0394)    (0.0352)    (0.1218)    (0.0781)   
M2GROWTH  0.0044 ***  0.0042 ***  -0.0343 *  -0.0202   
   (0.0011)    (0.0010)    (0.0196)    (0.0129)   
TOT  0.1629 ***  0.0514 *  0.2489 ***  0.1397 *** 
   (0.0287)    (0.0294)    (0.0721)    (0.0417)   
CAR  0.7105 ***  0.4632 ***  -0.3131    0.0775   
   (0.1967)    (0.1784)    (0.4675)    (0.3056)   
YRSOFFC  .-0.044516 ***  -0.0307 ***  0.0038    -0.0084   
   (0.0082)    (0.0070)    (0.0421)    (0.0185)   
NATIONALIST  -2.4600 ***  -2.8011 ***  -0.3529    -0.5481   
   (0.6286)    (0.5783)    (1.1684)    (0.7083)   
MAJORITY  0.0298    0.0044    -0.7600    0.3492   
   (0.1812)    (0.1896)    (0.4642)    (0.3594)   
Observations  448      448      112      154    
 Log-likelihood  -632.0558      -361.4228      -84.1975      -152.9535    
 LR 
2(14) c
c  18.125      23.304      43.0722      39.7188    
Notes: The figures in parentheses are standard deviations.  
* z statistics are significant at the 10 % level; ** significant at the 5 % level; *** significant at the 1 % 
level.  
a  : The IMF1 represents the IMF classification since 1999. 
b  : The IMF2 is constructed by combining the IMF classifications before and after 1999.   
c : The
2 c  value is defined as 2 (L1-L0), where the L0 is the value of log-likelihood function with only the 
constant term, and L1 is the value of the log-likelihood function when all the explanatory variables are 
included.  
A positive sign of a coefficient means that an increase in the associated variable raises 
the  probability  of  adopting  a  flexible  exchange  rate  regime.  Most  of  the  signs  of 
optimum  currency  variables  in  the  first  and  the  second  regressions  are  found  as 
expected.  For  example,  the  size  of  economy,  level  of  development  (geographical 
concentration of trade) are expected to have a positive (negative) sign and their signs are International Conference on Emerging Economic Issues in a Globalizing World, Đzmir, 2008 
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found  to  be  positive  (negative).  Although  the  sign  of  openness  is  expected  to  be 
negative,  it  is  found  to  be  positive.  In  contrast  to  the  variables  mentioned  above, 
inflation affects negatively the probability of selecting a flexible exchange rate regime. 
Although most of the signs are as expected, the size of economy in the regression I and, 
OPENNESS  and  GEOGTRADE  in  the  regression  II  are  statistically  insignificant. 
MAJORITY is positive, but insignificant in both the two regressions.  
RESERVES,  YRSOFFC  and  NATIONALIST  are  negatively  and  significantly 
associated with a flexible regime while M2GROWTH, TOT, CAR are positively and 
significantly associated with a flexible regime. The result related to YRSOFFC says that 
political stability is in favor of adopting a fixed regime. Like YRSOFFC, the sign of 
NATIONALIST implies that nationalist governments want to adopt more fixed regimes. 
In the three regressions, the current account deficit /surplus and de facto capital account 
openness are statistically insignificant.  
Most of the variables in the regressions III and IV used the de jure classification are 
statistically insignificant. In contrast to the expected sign, it is found that the level of 
development  decreases  the  probability  of  adopting  a  flexible  regime  in  both  the 
regressions. Similarly, contrary to the expected sign, the geographic concentration of 
trade is significantly and positively associated with a flexible regime.   
When the four regressions are taken into consideration, the only two variables ( level of 
development and TOT) are statistically significant. Nevertheless, the level of economy 
has  a  positive  sign  in  the  regressions  I  and  II,  whereas  it  has  a  negative  in  the 
regressions III and IV. When the de facto and de jure classifications are compared to 
each other, it appears that the relationship between the de facto classifications and the 
determinants of exchange rate regimes are stronger than the relationship between the de 
jure classifications and the determinants of regimes.  
Conclusion 
In  this  paper,  we  apply  a  random  effect  ordered  probit  model  to  estimate  the 
determinants of exchange rate regimes in 25 emerging market economies. We consider 
a  wide  range  of  potential  regime  determinants  including  the  OCA  fundamentals, 
macroeconomic aggregates, and political and institutional features. To avoid potentially 
misleading  classification,  we  use  two  different  measures  of  the  dependent  variable, 
namely de jure (official) and de facto (actual) choice of exchange rate regimes. The 
estimations of the de jure and de facto specifications generate different results for the 
variables. The de facto models produce a better fit. This is consistent with the notion 
that official regime changes carry a cost that exceeds the cost of changing the de facto 
regime, and that country use this as a policy instrument to adjust their exchange rate 
policy to macroeconomic developments earlier and faster than they respond with their 
official  regime.  Therefore,  it  can  be  said  that  the  de  facto  classifications  should  be 
preferred in order to classify the exchange rate regimes in emerging economies. It is 
found that  the de jure regimes are not enough to explain the relationship between the 
exchange rate policies and the variables.  Almost all the macroeconomic and political 
variables in the de jure models are found to be statistically insignificant.  
 International Conference on Emerging Economic Issues in a Globalizing World, Đzmir, 2008 
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Based on the findings obtained from the de facto regressions, we may conclude that the 
choice  of  exchange  rate  regime  adopted  by  25  emerging  economies  for  the  periods 
under discussion have been influenced by the level of economic development, inflation 
differential  and  political  factors,  and  not  influenced  by    the  current  account 
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Appendix I 
Table 2: Definition of Variables and Sources 
Variable  Explanation  Database 
 GDP   Log of GDP (constant 2000 US$), lagged one period  WDI online 
 GDPpercapita   Log of GDP per capita (constant 2000 US$), lagged one period  WDI Online 
 OPENNES    (Exports + Imports) / 2, lagged one period  IFS Online 
 INFLATION 
 inflation differential: domestic inflation minus USA inflation, lagged 
one period  IFS Online 
 GEOGTRADE 
 Share of Export to the largest Trade Partner in total Exports, lagged one 
period  DOT Online 
 CAOPENNESS 
 Sum of the absolute value of inward and outward gross capital as a ratio 
of GDP,  lagged one period  IFS Online 
 CA   Current account deficit or surplus as a share of GDP, lagged one period  WDI online 
 RESERVES   Total reserves in months of imports, lagged one period  WDI online 
 M2GROWTH   Annual Growth Rate of  Money plus Quasi money, lagged one period  IFS Online 
 TOT   Standard deviation of annual percentage change of  terms of trade  WDI online 
 CAR   Existence of Capital Account Restrictions, lagged one period 
Prasad, et. al. 
(2003). 
 YRSOFFC   How many years has the chief executive been in office?  DPI 2006  
 NATIONALIST  Nationalist (1 if yes)   DPI 2006  
 MAJORITY 
 Does the party of the executive have an absolute majority in the houses 
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Appendix II 
Table 3: Summary Statistics of Variables Used in the Analysis (the period 1970-
2006) 
Variable  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
CA  715  -1.95  4.55  -18.18  18.04 
OPENNESS  858  45.18  29.64  4.98  199.50 
GDP  857  25.02  1.19  21.43  28.27 
GDPpercapita  857  7.48  1.05  4.66  9.82 
RESERVES  731  4.36  2.50  0.31  13.76 
M2GROWTH  836  62.94  307.45  -43.74  6384.95 
INFLATION  839  53.99  353.34  -13.37  7476.26 
CAOPENNESS  714  7.68  5.80  0.06  51.24 
TOT  564  8.18  3.84  1.67  17.15 
CAR  730  0.84  0.37  0  1 
GEOGTRADE  607  27.06  14.38  6  89 
YRSOFFC  701  7.39  8.84  1  46 
NATIONALIST  697  0.08  0.27  0  1 
MAJORITY  626  0.60  0.49  0  1 International Conference on Emerging Economic Issues in a Globalizing World, Đzmir, 2008 
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Appendix III 
Table 4: Correlation Matrix 
 Variable  CA 
OPENN


















CA  1                                     
OPENNESS  0.058  1                                  
GDP  0.229  -0.408  1                               
GDPpercapita  0.043  0.150  0.241  1                            
RESERVES  0.230  -0.188  0.150  0.069  1                         
M2GROWTH  0.027  -0.149  0.123  0.095  0.065  1                      
INFLATION  0.027  -0.145  0.095  0.082  0.052  0.897  1                   
CAOPENNES
S  -0.109  0.415  -0.253  0.262  0.042  -0.042  -0.028  1                
TOT  0.040  -0.365  0.271  -0.442  0.104  0.146  0.110  -0.325  1             
CAR  0.025  -0.138  -0.061  -0.012  -0.163  0.087  0.086  -0.041  -0.217  1          
GEOGTRAD
E  -0.034  0.020  0.233  0.296  -0.283  -0.055  -0.057  -0.111  0.091  -0.153  1       
YRSOFFC  -0.008  0.234  -0.437  -0.134  -0.104  -0.107  -0.104  0.030  0.071  -0.129  -0.053  1    
NATIONALI
ST  0.024  -0.170  0.175  0.253  0.109  0.084  0.130  0.107  -0.189  -0.126  -0.055  -0.061  1 
MAJORITY  -0.065  0.146  -0.319  -0.209  -0.162  -0.035  0.005  -0.009  0.075  -0.221  0.105  0.470  0.095 
 
 